Investigating the recent direct action campaigns against genetically-modified crops in
This article examines an empirical puzzle that arises from differences between campaigns of sabotage against genetically-modified organisms (henceforth: GMOs) in the United Kingdom and France, since 1997. In France, most activists committed open, public, mass 'civic disobedience' against GM crops, in broad daylight, as part of a nationally coordinated citizens' campaign. But in the UK, activists were split between accountable, public, and symbolic actions, and covert, anonymous, usually nocturnal, destruction. Most 'croptrashing' in the UK was covert, and most activists preferred to avoid arrest and trial; most crop-trashing in France has been overt, with most activists accepting arrest and trial as a necessary cost of their action. How can we account for these tactical divergences? Given the similar strategic aims of crop-trashing, we aim to do so by looking at one highly relevant area of systemic difference between France and the UK: the structure and operation of the criminal justice system. We thus investigate how an external structure (the judicial system) interacts with internal ideological debates to explain differences in the tactical choices made by movements.
Why accord such importance to the criminal justice system? Clearly, it will be of relatively minor (though, clearly also, not nil) significance for collective actors not engaged in direct action. However, for policy-oriented campaigns of deliberate law breaking, the criminal justice system provides a crucial site of intermediation between state and movement; it is logical to assume that where actors are (i) involved in illegal activity with the goal of achieving policy change and (ii) seeking to minimise the costs and maximise the advantages of their action, the operative judicial system will be a key factor in (a) the decisions made by movement actors to undertake illegal action, (b) the design of the action, and (c) the consequent positions adopted by movement actors with respect to judicial proceedings. We might thus expect that given the nature of the campaigns against GM crops, activists who 3 have chosen a strategy based on direct action (and thus which is likely to lead to arrest) will choose tactics likely to maximise their success chances in relation to the judicial system. But we expect also that collective identity -'the shared definition of a group that derives from its members' common interests and solidarity' (Taylor, 1989, p.771) -is likely to be crucial to the way that movements negotiate their choices within these structural contexts (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Taylor, 2010) . Movements, after all, often differ internally over both strategy and tactics, and these differences suggest that ideas play a role in determining what actors see as appropriate forms of action (Smithey, 2009) . As Johnston argues, most scholars would probably agree that a complete analysis of social movement mobilization requires some mix of elements focusing on perception/interpretation […] as well as those elements that capture the compelling and constraining qualities of 'hard' institutional arrangements -meaning opportunities that compel action straightforwardly and threats that constrain automatically -both requiring little interpretative creativity. The question is how to sort out the appropriate mix. (2011, p.49) In practice, efforts to do this are very rare, probably because it is very difficult to do with any clarity: a mix of institutional determination and contingent interpretation militates against clear causal analysis. We seek to overcome this difficulty through a close comparison of crop-trashing in the UK and France, testing two rival hypotheses: that (i) external (judicial) institutions and (ii) movement ideas are the decisive factors in explaining the tactical choices of activists. We proceed therefore by the method of paired comparison. As a comparative method, this has some advantages over both single case studies and large n comparisons 4 (Tarrow, 2010, pp.243-6) ; first, because it allows for more intimate analysis based on deeper background knowledge than is available in the latter method; second, because it enables the assessment of the impact of a single variable or mechanism (in this case, judicial institutions) across systems, which the single national case study is unable to achieve. Our comparison is therefore based on a 'most different cases' research design.
In section I, therefore, we briefly discuss the importance of criminal justice systems to the institutional contexts of social movements, before setting out the key differences between the organization and operation of the judicial systems in the UK and France. The British and French judicial regimes are each is the mother lode of a distinct legal tradition: civil law in France, and common law in England (and Wales). Balas et al (2009) underline that substantive and procedural legal rules and regulations differ systematically between countries that have adopted these traditions; systemic differences include approaches to collecting evidence, the importance of trial, the selection and function of judges, the degree of procedural formalisation, the importance of case law, and the role of juries (see also David & Jauffret-Spinosi, 2002, pp.10-11) . Moreover, comparing British and French anti-GMO activism in English and French judicial settings provides us with a third, 'control' case, because Scotland's judicial system is a 'mixed jurisdiction', combining elements of both legal traditions. We set out our hypotheses at the end of section I.
In section II, we test these hypotheses, drawing the contours of the anti-GM crop campaigns in France and the UK, discussing the staging of direct action, and subsequent prosecutions. In section III we discuss movement debates about attitudes towards arrest and trial, paying particular attention to debates over public accountability in each movement. Our data is drawn from over ten years of study of environmental protest in the UK and France, including 5 interviews with movement activists, observations of activist meetings and criminal trials, supplemented by reports drawn from the activist and mass media (for our previous work on these and related movements, see Doherty, 1999; Hayes, 2002; Doherty & Hayes, 2011) . Data for the UK draws on material from a research project on UK environmental direct action, which involved a close reading of activist newsletters, and interviews with fifteen activists; data for France is derived from similar sources and processes, including eleven interviews with key informants.
1 Following the completion of the research we carried out follow-up interviews, and an extensive survey of newspaper reports in the British and French press. All the written sources we cite are publicly available, but interviewees' names have been anonymized, except for publicly recognised figures.
I Structuring Difference: Criminal Justice Systems, Legal and Judicial Opportunity
The literature on political opportunity structures counts the independence of the judicial system as a key variable in its determination of state capacity (Tarrow, 1998; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004) ; states which have an independent judiciary and where there is extensive legal codification offer greater checks and balances on executive power. Consequently -and bearing in mind that this is but one variable within a complex series -challenging groups may enjoy greater opportunities for effective opposition to governmental policies, projects, or programmes, and may further be reasonably expected to adopt more moderate forms of protest. However, where states do not have a fully independent judiciary or extensive legal codification, opposition movements have fewer systemic means for opposition or redress.
Where effective opportunities are lacking, social movements can be expected to adopt more conflictual forms of protest and develop dissent on specific issues into more general critiques of the political system (Kriesi et al, 1992; Duyvendak, 1995) . 6 The judiciary is thus typically associated in political opportunity analyses with the strength or effectiveness of policy implementation (Kitschelt, 1986, pp.63-5) . Discussion of potential systemic openness and exclusion focuses on the legal instruments available to either the state (such as injunctions) or to protesters (such as the codification of rights, or the development of, say, environmental law; see, for example, Dryzek et al, 2003, pp.30-4, pp.50-4) . Legal and judicial systems are thus important to our conception of movement mobilization, although they have received relatively little sustained attention in this context.
Where analysis has examined the relationships between social movements and the law, the predominant focus has been on 'legal mobilization', where 'law provides both normative principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social struggle [and] is mobilized when a desire or want is translated into an assertion of right or lawful claim' (McCann, 2004, p.508) .
A series of collections brought together by Sarat and Scheingold (1998 , 2005a has examined the role of cause lawyers in such mobilizations, stressing not only their advocacy but also their ideological contribution, helping movements 'define the realm of the possible' (Sarat & Scheingold, 2005b, p.10) . Stressing a bottom-up, 'support-structure explanation' for the 'rights revolution' of increased judicial attention to and support for individual rights that has taken place in the USA over the past fifty years, Epp (1998) also underlines the key role played by rights-advocacy lawyers in bringing this about, in conjunction with the development of movement organizations articulating rights claims.
Within this tradition of legal mobilization, a number of commentators have recently argued that the concept of legal opportunity structure should be seen as distinct from political opportunity structure, and can provide a more thorough understanding of the role of legal 7 strategies in protest (Hilson, 2002; ' (2006, p.12) .
The contributions of the legal mobilization literature to our understanding of the interplay between social movements and the law are important ones. However, the predominant focus here is on litigation as an offensive tactic. Analyses typically focus on the furtherance of rights-based claims making, particularly in the context of judicial review and constitutional courts (e.g. Smith, 2005; Andersen, 2006; Wilson & Cordero, 2006; Barclay et al, 2009; Vanhala, 2009a; Vanhala, 2009b) ; there is a focus on North America. Explicitly crossnational comparative analysis is rare (Epp 1998 being an exception). Explanations of activist tactics within contrasting judicial traditions and systems has been curiously overlooked, with systemic differences typically situated at the macro-level, such as between liberal and authoritarian regimes (e.g. Sarat & Scheingold, 1998 Activists can therefore argue (as crop-trashers have in both countries) that a given act of law breaking was committed in order to stop a greater one; they may also call witnesses to contextualise and substantiate their defence. Beyond these important commonalities, however, there are significant structural differences between the two systems.
The first relates to the operation of juries. The common law tradition asserts individual freedoms over state prerogatives: the principle of jury trial delegates control over adjudication to the 'lay judges' of juries (La Porta et al, 2002, p.8) . In England, this option is open to activists brought before Crown Courts, though not for minor criminal offences, which are heard without a jury in Magistrates' Courts (where criminal damage is involved, the figure of £5000 acts as a threshold; jury trials are only possible only where damage is estimated to be above this figure) . In France, juries only operate in the assize courts (cours d'assises), which deal with major criminal cases ('crimes', defined by prospective sentences of at least ten years in prison). Less serious offences ('délits') are held in tribunaux correctionnels before a magistrate, normally accompanied by two assessors. For anti-GMO activists prosecuted in France, therefore, there is effectively no option of a jury trial; verdicts are handed down by magistrates. A second important distinction concerns the importance of precedent. Case law, or the body of law as derived from the decisions and practices of the courts, is the cornerstone of the English common law system (Simpson, 1973, p.94; WesleySmith, 1994, p.8) , which thus grants considerable discretion and independence to judges (though in routine criminal cases, English courts are bound by precedent from higher courts).
In contrast, the civil law tradition conceives law as a system of rules, the imposition of statute (La Porta et al, 2002, p.9) . As a result, jurisprudential reasoning plays a minor role only in French civil law; formally, French judges enjoy neither significant levels of freedom from political interference nor flexibility and power to shape the law through their decisions.
Judicial independence in France remains frequently compromised by explicit government intervention in the terms of prosecution and the application of sentences (there is, indeed, substantial evidence of direct ministerial intervention in both policing and judicial decisions on anti-GMO activists, for example).
Scotland provides an intermediate case. It has a mixed legal system: its post-Renaissance foundations are based, like the French civil law tradition, on Roman law; but, in contrast to the Napoleonic codification of civil law at the heart of the French tradition, Scottish law remains uncodified and, following the 1707 Act of Union with England and the Napoleonic wars a century later, its subsequent development has been highly influenced by the English legal tradition (Tetley, 1999; Walker, 2001 ). For our purposes, the mixed nature of the Scottish system provides a control for our investigation of the influence of criminal justice systems and activist ideas on tactical choice. Whilst anti-GMO activists in Scotland belonged to the same networks as those in England and Wales and are thus part of the same national anti-GMO movement, the court procedure in criminal cases differs in Scotland from that in England and Wales, and in key respects is structurally similar to the French procedure: jury trials are only available in Scotland for serious crimes ('solemn procedure'), whilst less serious crimes (those for which the maximum penalties are twelve months in prison and a £10,000 fine) such as crop-trashing are judged either by a magistrate or justice of the peace sitting alone, or by three justices of the peace sitting together ('summary procedure').
Comparison with the tactical choices of Scottish activists should therefore enable us to control our findings from the English and French cases.
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What then can we expect the effect of these structural and operational differences to be on the conduct of illegal direct action against GMOs in Scotland, France, and England? We suggest that it produces a first set of two hypotheses concerning what we might term a judicial opportunity structure:
P1.the structural differences between criminal justice systems will have a significant impact on the prosecution outcomes of activists tried for non-violent direct action;
P2. In seeking to undertake an effective direct action campaign, activists will make tactical choices which reflect these differential success chances.
II Comparing Anti-GMO Movements
Crop-trashing has taken place in several European countries, but to date by far the most Direct action against GM crops in the UK and France was only one part of a broader campaign in which NGOs, independent scientists, and consumer groups lobbied government, biotech corporations, and food producers, and engaged in public information campaigns. This broad anti-GMO movement developed apace within the EU once GM soy beans began to arrive in European ports in 1996 (Ansell et al, 2006; Schurman & Munro, 2009 ). Greenpeace was a leading and early actor in the anti-GMO campaigns across Europe, organising blockades at ports including Liverpool and Saint Nazaire in 1996, and co-ordinating transnational action at EU level (Purdue, 2000; Ansell et al, 2006) . Greenpeace UK carried out a high-profile crop-trash at Lyng in Norfolk in 1999, which along with the subsequent acquittal of the 28 participants by juries in two trials, gained more coverage than any other single crop-trash in the UK. But this was a one-off, media-oriented action, and although
Greenpeace remained a vital part of national and European lobby-based campaigns, in the UK and France other groups emerged which acted independently of it, using sabotage (including crop-trashing) as a principal tactic. It is these groups that are the subject of this study.
In France, the leading role has been played by the leftist peasant farmers' union La Confédération paysanne (CP) which has undertaken direct action against GM crops since 1997, and whose leading activists have become the public face of the campaign (particularly (Hayes, 2007) . The FV campaign was, in Bové's words, explicitly devised so that 'it wasn't just peasant farmers who undertook actions', following the initial period where the CP 'essentially acted as a syndicalized organization'. 2 It was also explicitly devised as a public campaign rather than an organization, in order to protect its member organizations financially; it is not registered, for example, as an association under French law. Prior to the FV campaign, organizations initiating actions were legally liable for compensation claims; the CP in particular was vulnerable to bankruptcy. In the FV campaign, however, activists could now only be individually liable, given the FV's lack of legal status.
In the UK, the organization of direct action against GM crops was much less co-ordinated than in France, with no national membership organization and no publicly identifiable leaders. Crop-trashing was principally carried out by informal locally-based groups of radical environmental activists who had developed direct action techniques in campaigns against the Conservative government's roads and airport expansion programmes in the mid-1990s (Wall, 2000; Thomas, 2001) . By the time that GM crops became a significant issue around 1998, they already had substantial experience of occupying sites, damaging property, and 14 committing illegal action (Seel et al, 2000; Plows et al, 2004; Doherty, 2007) . The relative success of these actions reinforced their belief that illegal and disruptive protest action could be effective and win significant public support. These activists were linked through a loose network of local groups known as Earth First! (EF!). EF! had no formal membership, no bureaucratic structure or office-holders, held only occasional national strategy gatherings and, in contrast to the FV, had no charter defining legitimate actions. Nominally distinct groups such as Reclaim the Streets, Corporate Watch, and genetiX snowball (gXs) overlapped with EF! (Wall, 2000) as part of the same 'movement community' (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2007) ; activists from all of these groups took part in the same protests and meetings, acting as individuals rather than as representatives of separate groups. They carried out both public and covert crop-trashing and other actions against bio-tech corporations and the food industry, including office occupations, and disruptive protests inside supermarkets and against their distribution networks. In public actions they would often be acting alongside a broader range of actors, including activists from more mainstream green NGOs, local residents, and farmers campaigning against a particular GM crop trial site.
There are a number of differences therefore in the organizations and movement traditions underpinning each campaign. Most significantly for our study, there were also fundamental differences in how the courts dealt with those arrested and charged for crop-trashing. The much publicised Greenpeace UK acquittals were part of a broader pattern in England where over the previous ten years, 'prosecutions of protesters against new roads and nuclear, chemical and arms trade companies collapsed after defendants argued that they had lawful excuse, had acted according to their consciences and that they were trying to prevent a greater crime'. 6 In addition, gXs activists successfully appealed against conviction for a crop-trash in Cambridge, with the judge deciding that it had been wrong to charge them with aggravated trespass (a public order offence tried before magistrates), which would have meant that they had no right to make a public interest defence. 7 In several further cases, charges were dropped, even when the evidence of crop trashing was clear (Thomas, 2001, pp.342-3) . As an activist newsletter reported, 'The Crown became somewhat reluctant to press for damages of over £5000 16 because this gives activists the right to ask for a trial by jury rather than a magistrate'. 8 Prosecutors would claim that there had been hardly any damage; campaigners would claim that they had in fact caused plenty, in order to try to get a jury trial.
In France, the story is somewhat different. worth of damage to a GMO crop-trial one year before. As she commented: 'I think it is bizarre that my husband, Alastair, can do the exact same thing with Greenpeace activists in Norwich and be acquitted, yet I am guilty'. 13 An activist website made the point: 'yes, but
Alistair had a jury!'.
14 What then of our hypotheses about a judicial opportunity structure? The evidence from our comparison of direct action prosecutions in the UK and France tends to confirm the first of our hypotheses, P1: the structural differences between criminal justice systems have a significant impact on the prosecution outcomes of activists tried for non-violent direct action.
Yet what of the second hypothesis P2 -that activists will make tactical choices which reflect these differential success chances? Here, the evidence is intriguing. We might expect to see Crucially, then, the difference in judicial systems in different parts of the UK has not produced difference in tactical choice, whilst the broad similarity of these institutional arrangements in France and Scotland has not produced similarity of tactical choice. The systemic properties of the judicial system do not seem to influence the likelihood that activists will undertake covert action: whether in favourable or unfavourable systems, British activists behave in the same way; unfavourable systems (France, Scotland) produce divergent (and counter-intuitive) activist tactical choices. How might we explain this? For an explanation, we turn to the ideas of activists, as reflected in and through their internal debates.
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III Constructing Accountability
In each movement, arguments over effectiveness and accountability are fundamental and revealing. As we shall see, not all those involved in the direct action networks in either country agreed on the tactics adopted. In Britain, there was a heated argument between those who favoured covert nocturnal sabotage with the aim of destroying as much of the crop as possible, and those committed to what they called 'accountable actions' involving symbolic amounts of destruction. This latter tactic was associated with genetiX snowball, formed in 1998; some of its founders had been active in campaigns against nuclear weapons and the arms trade since the 1980s, and later became involved in Earth First! campaigns in the 1990s (Wall, 2000) . One prominent activist, Angie Zelter, was also one of the four women who had stood trial for 'disarming' a Hawk jet aircraft with hammers at BAe's Warton factory in January 1996; at Liverpool crown court, they explained their action as necessary because this type of aircraft had been sold to the Indonesian Air Force and used to kill civilians in East
Timor. The jury, accepting that this constituted 'reasonable grounds', acquitted them by majority verdict.
There was significant overlap between 1990s environmental direct action networks and peace and anti-militarist activists, for whom the highpoint of 'non-violent direct action' had been the peace camps and protests against the deployment of Cruise missiles across western Europe in 1983. Like most western European countries (but unlike France), there was a mass peace movement in Britain which regularly mobilized hundreds of thousands of activists between 1980-87. gXs revived a peace movement repertoire of the mid-1980s, where hundreds of activists were arrested in a 'snowball' of protests that grew progressively larger; gXs aimed to encourage enough people to commit to taking action against GM crop trials to 21 make the government institute a five-year moratorium on all testing and cultivation. The methods chosen were non-confrontational and public: protesters informed the farmers and police in advance that they would be taking action (although not necessarily when), were limited to damaging 100 plants each, acted only in daylight, and were prepared to be arrested 
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Specifically French, these discourses found no echo in Britain. In contrast, for both gXs and the wider crop-trashing networks, the question of the legitimacy of the court was left to the activist to decide, with no effort to establish a collective view. Sanction had a purely tactical value: gXs argued that by accepting arrest they could exploit the courts as a public arena to challenge injustice. This meant being prepared to engage in legal battles, which seemed a 24 distraction to others. For instance, following the first gXs crop-trash in July 1998, Monsanto took out an injunction against gXs to prevent it damaging further crop trials; an activist critical of gXs commented:
Anyway at the end of the day Snowball did some small actions, and more and more people got injuncted, and they weren't the kinds of people who need to get injuncted, get their houses taken off them -it's different for us. They got embroiled in these court cases, they only pulled up a very small number of crops, they scared off the people they were trying to get involved, and it took maybe 10 activists over a year of very focused work to pull up a couple of hundred crops whereas covertly doing it the same number of activists could have pulled up thousands of crops. Insofar as the measures of success were preventing the crop from cross-pollinating and undermining the crop trials, it was argued that covert action was simply more effective because more plants could be destroyed (see the quotation above). These activists also argued that gXs was elitist, because only the able-bodied and those without mortgages and families 25 would be prepared to accept arrest and trial (Leeds Earth First!, 1998) . Importantly, gXs was also challenged on ideological grounds:
Covert action questions the legitimacy of the legal system's handing out punishment -surely a necessary question to ask of an institution which has proved time and time again that its priorities are not to end injustice nor to stop ecological degradation.
While the odds are stacked against us and the system does not share our interests, covert action has a part to play in an effective strategy.
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This critique was also voiced in activist debates over tactics, such as at the Earth First! were regularly greeted at pre-announced crop-trashes by gendarmes and pro-GMO farmers).
One group published a nocturnal crop-trash charter in summer 2007, 22 extolling autonomy and anonymity and rejecting collective decision-making and submission to arrest, arguing that covert action by a 'self-managing collective' is more effective than (what it perceived to be) a 'bureaucratic and hierarchical' national organization.
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In both countries, therefore, there were divisions over tactics and the ideological principles that justified them. Yet whilst in the UK, the argument essentially took place within an
anarchistic network about what forms of protest were consistent with their shared critique of the state, in France the argument essentially took place amongst groups with contrasting critiques of the state. In the UK, although public symbolic actions by Greenpeace, gXs and others received considerable media coverage, the majority of actions were covert and unclaimed; in France, the movement crystallised around public acts of civil disobedience.
Conclusions
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What then does our evidence tell us? First, it tells us that systemic structural differences are crucial to understanding the differential prosecution outcomes for social movement actors.
Moreover, systemic differences are stable, predictable, and consistent; we believe, therefore, that the concept of a judicial opportunity structure can be a valid and useful one for understanding the trajectories and outcomes of direct action campaigns in particular, and is analytically distinct from the litigation-focused concept of 'legal opportunity structure'.
Second, however, our evidence tells us that movement tactical choices cannot simply be read off from these systemic properties; in the case of the anti-GMO campaigns in the three countries studied, we see activist tactics which are themselves consistent, but are not consistent with the expectations derived from the criminal justice systems.
There are three reasons why this might be: (i) activists are unaware of the organization of the criminal justice system; (ii) they are aware of it, but misperceive how it operates; (iii) they perceive it correctly, but their crop-trashing tactics are not pre-determined by it. As should be evident from our discussion, we are reasonably confident that neither (i) nor (ii) are valid here; indeed, at the FV annual meeting in 2011, 24 there was sustained collective discussion of the fine detail of arrest and trial, including discussion of the precise form of words best used in custody to maximise the chances of producing a collective prosecution (thus recognising how the criminal justice system operates) coupled with continued debate over the effectiveness of prosecutions in achieving movement goals (thus relating outcomes to tactical choice). 25 The evidence from both our cases overwhelmingly supports (iii), and specifically that debates over ideas within movements are decisive in explaining tactical choice. As we have seen, most British activists spurned the openings potentially provided by acquittals and the reluctance of judges to impose more than token penalties, whereas French activists instrumentalized court cases as occasions to reinforce collective identity and maintain 28 political pressure. The reasons explaining tactical choice thus only become evident when examining the internal debates within each movement.
We referred at the outset to the difficulty of sorting out the appropriate mix in the determination of activist tactical choice (Johnston, 2011, p.49) . No answer to that problem is likely to apply to all cases, but we suggest in this case that activist ideas are fundamental to their perception of whether the criminal justice system provides an opportunity or threat the realisation of their political goals. To be sure, this does not mean that structures are not important, or that ideas alone explain tactical choices. First, because the results of court cases are central to our understanding of group mobilization: as noted above, movement actors are cognisant of the likely outcomes of arrest and trial, and make tactical choices that are informed by these consequences, and this is true irrespective of the counter-intuitive nature of these choices. Second, because ideas are not negotiated outwith specific cultural contexts; social movement actors in each country acted in ways that were consistent with particular social movement traditions, which we can see as a useful 'bridging concept' between structure and culture (see Doherty & Hayes, 2011) .
As Polletta argues, cultural traditions, arrangements, codes and so on may be considered structuring in that they are supraindividual; political structures and embedded ways of acting are themselves a product of culturally specific development (1999, pp.67-9) . Clearly, in our cases, the political traditions of each state are different; a Republican narrative of active citizenship may be considered to be structuring for contentious action in France (see, for example, Hewlett, 1998, pp.11-35) , and this is not available to activists in the UK. Moreover, these ideas are negotiated within specific movement-organisational contexts: there is no direct equivalent in the UK of the Confédération paysanne; there was no counterpart in 29 France of the 1980s British peace movement, for example. In France, the Faucheurs Volontaires campaign sought regulatory intervention from the state; in the UK, most anti-GMO activists and their precursors saw themselves as radicals, essentially different from the rest of society, and viewed the state as an instrument of global capital and corporations. In this sense their tactics might be construed as an instance of 'path dependency' (Pierson, 2000) . But as we have shown in our discussion on effectiveness and accountability, there is nothing inevitable about the positions adopted by either movement; in both cases, the dominant ideological position was contested, and movement tactics were produced by a process of challenge and negotiation.
It is possible that the example of the anti-GMO campaigns in the UK and France provides a unique case. We rather doubt it, however. It is true that the FV campaign is distinctive in its offensive use of the court as a venue for challenge, but there have been a number of other cases in recent years in the UK and France in which those arrested for protests (against the arms trade, on climate change, or in anti-advertising actions, for example) have sought to turn criminal defence into political attack, using prosecution to establish the legitimacy of their position and to mobilize wider support. In particular, the availability of jury trials appears to increase the chances of success in the courthouse, demonstrating the importance of judicial structures for the analysis of social movements, and the potential political outcomes of deliberate collective law breaking. However, how social movement actors choose to exploit these judicial opportunities is dependent not just on external structuring factors, but on the negotiation of ideas -about identity, about the nature of accountability, about effectivenesswithin specific movement settings. We hope further work will address both how prosecution affects mobilization, and how, comparatively, different systems affect similar mobilizations.
